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Abstract
In this paper, we initiate the study of the multiplicative bidding language adopted by major
Internet search companies. In multiplicative bidding, the effective bid on a particular search
auction is the product of a base bid and bid adjustments that are dependent on features of the
search (for example, the geographic location of the user, or the platform on which the search is
conducted). We consider the task faced by the advertiser when setting these bid adjustments,
and establish a foundational optimization problem that captures the core difficulty of bidding
under this language. We give matching algorithmic and approximation hardness results for this
problem; these results are against an information-theoretic bound, and thus have implications
on the power of the multiplicative bidding language itself. Inspired by empirical studies of
search engine price data, we then codify the relevant restrictions of the problem, and give further
algorithmic and hardness results. Our main technical contribution is an O(log n)-approximation
for the case of multiplicative prices and monotone values. We also provide empirical validations
of our problem restrictions, and test our algorithms on real data against natural benchmarks.
Our experiments show that they perform favorably compared with the baseline.
1 Introduction
Real-time ad auctions play a vital role in monetizing the Internet. In a real-time ad auction, bids
are entered by the advertiser beforehand, and the auction is conducted at the time of a pageview
or search. Each individual search query or pageview has a possibly unique set of features (e.g.,
geographic location, time of day, device, etc.) that can have a significant effect on the value of the
ad to the bidder, as well as the market price of the ad placement.
Recently, some of the major search engines have started to allow an advertiser to set bid adjust-
ments on their ad campaign in order to account for differences in valuation that are a function of
these types of features [11, 3]. Indeed the transition to this mode of bidding has been characterized
as one of the most important recent changes to AdWords [13]. For example, one could set a bid
adjustment of 1.1 for search queries originating in California, an adjustment of 0.9 for queries sub-
mitted from 2-3pm, and another adjustment of 1.2 for mobile devices. Then, for a base bid of $1,
your final bid on a California mobile query between 2-3pm would be $1× 1.1× .9× 1.2 = $1.188.
Bid adjustments allow an advertiser to express relative valuation across a supported feature
type (for example, geographic location), but do not allow for specifying valuation on arbitrary
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combinations of features. For example, if an advertiser found that mobile searches were 30% more
valuable than desktop searches in New York, but only 15% more valuable in California, then this
would not be expressible in the language of bid adjustments. Such limitations are inevitable, as
the space of possible combinations of these features is prohibitively large. There are, of course,
other bidding schemes with succinct bid representations. We have chosen to study multiplicative
bidding here because it is the status quo. Investigating the expressive power of other schemes is an
interesting future direction.
In this paper, we initiate the theoretical and empirical study of multiplicative bidding and
examine the task faced by advertisers given the option of setting bid adjustments. We begin by
whittling it down to a simple, elegant optimization problem on two feature dimensions. This
problem still captures the tension of bidding “multiplicatively,” rather than individually on each
auction, while ignoring some of the unrelated idiosyncrasies of search ad auctions. We then fully
explore the complexity of this optimization problem. We first show that the problem is Ω(
√
n)-hard
to approximate, and give an algorithm which exactly matches this hardness ratio. Because these
results are in relation to a solution where a bidder can bid individually on each feature combination,
this also implies an information-theoretic limitation of the multiplicative bidding language itself.
Motivated by analyses on real search auction data, we then examine the effect of assuming
various conditions (e.g., monotonicity on the values and prices in different dimensions). As our
main technical contribution, we develop an O(log n) approximation algorithm when prices are
multiplicative and values are monotone in one dimension. We validate our assumptions on search
auction data, and test our algorithm on this data against natural benchmarks. Before elaborating
on our results and techniques, we present a formal model of the multiplicative bidding problem,
and later (in Section 1.2) describe details of our theoretical and empirical results.
1.1 Model
Most search engines conduct some variant of the generalized second price (GSP) auction to sell ad
placements on user search queries. Since we are studying the advertiser-facing budget optimiza-
tion problem, an appropriate model for an individual auction would be the “landscape” model
from Feldman et al. [9] (see also Section 1.3). In this model there is a set of threshold bids b1, . . . , bn
(where n is the number of positions on the page, a small constant), and bidding in the interval
[bi, bi+1] gives some number of clicks at a cost of bi per click. A special case of this model (when
n = 1) is a take-it-or-leave-it click at a fixed price p. We will assume this special case in the present
paper for simplicity, since the task of multiplicative bidding is still sufficiently sophisticated in this
case. Extending to multiple click supply, multiple ad positions, or multiple queries with different
market prices is an interesting direction for future work.
The bidding dimensions supported by the major search engines include time of day, geographic
location, platform (e.g., mobile device vs. desktop) and keyword targeting. Thus it is reasonable to
assume that the number of dimensions is small, but the number of different values in each dimension
is possibly large (for example, AdWords allows bid multipliers at 15-minute intervals in a week,
and at postal-code geographic level). A reasonable place to start is the 2-dimensional problem,
where each dimension has a large number of possible values; for the purposes of technical focus, we
consider only this case in the paper, and leave it open to extend our results to multiple dimensions.
Given these modeling considerations, we now propose the first model for the multiplicative
bidding problem. We feel that this simple model retains the salient feature of the problem—namely,
the tension of bidding multiplicatively—and is a solid foundation on which to inspire future work
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in this area.
The Multiplicative Bidding Problem. Suppose there are two bid adjustment dimensions with
m and n possible settings, respectively. For each entry (i, j) ∈ [m] × [n], an advertiser is given a
price pij > 0 and value vij ≥ 0. He is required to specify a bid multiplier ri for each row i ∈ [m]
and cj for each column j ∈ [n]. The effective bid for cell (i, j) is then ri · cj .
A cell (i, j) is said to be captured if its effective bid is at least the price, i.e., ri · cj ≥ pij . The
advertiser also has a budget B > 0 and is subject to the budget constraint∑
(i,j):ricj≥pij
pij ≤ B.
His objective is to maximize the total value gained∑
(i,j):ricj≥pij
vij .
Relation to knapsack. Multiplicative bidding can be viewed as a restricted version of the classical
knapsack problem. Indeed, if we were free to bid any amount on each individual cell, we would be
able to capture any desired subset of the cells, where each cell is simply an item with a price and
value. We will refer to this solution as the individual bidding optimum, or simply, OPT.
With multiplicative bidding, as we shall see, not all subsets of the cells can be captured. Con-
sequently, we are optimizing over a smaller space, and the best solution available can be no better
than the individual bidding optimum.
Approximation benchmarks. One of our objectives is to quantify how much efficiency is po-
tentially lost by restricting an advertiser to multiplicative bidding (compared to a real-time bid, as
is common in Ad Exchanges, for example). In light of this, the most natural benchmark would be
the optimal individual bidding solution OPT. We abuse notation by using OPT to denote both the
set of cells in the optimum as well as their total value.
To simplify our presentation, we will assume that OPT simply chooses the cells with the best
vij/pij ratio while not exhausting the budget B. This assumption is reasonable in two ways. First
of all, the reader may have already noticed that the above is the well-known 2-approximation for
knapsack and thus we lose a factor of at most 2 by adopting such a solution. Secondly, in the
context of Internet advertising, very often each pij and vij is small compared to the overall spend
and value derived, in which case our solution is in fact (1 − )-approximate. More specifically, we
assume that pij/B <  for all (i, j). The reader may readily verify that this is indeed an (1 − )-
approximation. We stress again that almost all our results remain valid without this assumption
since OPT is a 2-approximation to the true optimum. This assumption is merely introduced in order
to simplify our exposition and avoid being overly verbose.
Another more benign benchmark would be the multiplicative bidding optimum, which is useful
for characterizing the computational hardness of finding a good solution. This is different from the
former benchmark which carries the flavor of “information theoretical” lower bounds. Somewhat
surprisingly, at least in the general case, the optimal approximation ratio is essentially the same
with respect to the individual bidding optimum (Lemma 1) and the multiplicative bidding optimum
(Lemma 4).
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Table 1: Lower bounds and algorithmic results on the approximation ratio in different cases.
General Monotone value-
-over-price
Monotone prices
and values
Multiplicative
prices
Multiplicative prices
and monotone values
Hardness Ω(
√
n) 1 1 Ω(n1/2−) Ω(
√
n) 1
Lemma 1 Lemma 3 Lemma 1
Algorithm O(
√
n) 1 O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(log n)
Theorem 1 Corollary 1 Theorem 1 Theorem 1 Theorem 2
1.2 Our contributions and techniques
The most important goal of our work is to establish a foundational multiplicative bidding problem
on which to build algorithmic insight. Given the prevalence of this new bidding language, this
represents an urgent call to investigate these bidding schemes in different scenarios and to design
better bid optimization algorithms for them.
To this end, we first start with the plain formulation of the problem as stated in Section 1.1,
and we are able to fully characterize its approximability to be Θ(
√
n). Our algorithm is greedy in
nature and uses the intuition provided by the hardness result. In order to better model the prices
and values that can arise from practice, we then consider a number of monotonicity conditions.
For instance, we say that the values are monotone along the rows if they can be permuted so that
vij increases as i increases. Our results are summarized in Table 1, which gives the complexity of
multiplicative bidding in different cases against the individual bidding optimum.
Unfortunately, the lower bound does not really improve even if the values and prices are mono-
tone for both rows and columns. Nevertheless, we find that the problem becomes tractable given
monotone value-over-price ratios (along either row or column). This prompts us to consider a
subclass of solutions, staircases, that are always feasible.
Building upon this staircase notion, we obtain the more optimistic approximation ratio of
O(log n) assuming that prices are multiplicative, i.e., pij = piqj and values are monotone along
one dimension. These assumptions are justified by empirical data validation (see Section 6.3). At
a high level, our algorithm attempts to extract a large subset of the optimum and patch it into
a staircase. However, care must be taken to avoid overspending. Indeed, the factor O(log n) is a
compromise between the budget constraint and staircase feasibility.
To apply our algorithms in practice, we must deal with the fact that our monotonicity assump-
tions hold only in an approximate sense. We address this in Section 6 by providing more robust
adaptations of two of our algorithms; these adaptations allow the algorithms to work in a general
setting, but still take advantage of the near-monotonicity of the data. We evaluate these algorithms
on real search auction data, and show that both have a significant gain over a benchmark inspired
by Feldman et al. [9].
1We have also shown that it is Ω(n1/2−)-hard to approximate against the less stringent multiplicative bidding
optimum (Lemma 4).
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1.3 Related work
This work is most related to the paper of Feldman, Muthukrishnan, Pa´l, and Stein [9] in which
the authors propose uniform bidding as a means for bid optimization in the presence of budget
constraints in sponsored-search ad auctions. There are several differences between this paper and
the previous line of work on uniform bidding. Most notably in the multi-dimensional settings, we
cannot apply the results of Feldman et al. [9] and Muthukrishnan et al. [16]. In fact, as we will
observe, our problem in general is inapproximable even for a simple setting.
Previous work on uniform bidding strategies assume that the number of impressions or clicks
that the advertiser gets varies as a function of the bid. Here, on the other hand, we assume that
bidding results in winning or not winning the impression. While our hardness results directly apply
to such more general settings, our approximation algorithm results need an extra step to generalize
to this setting. We leave this as an interesting future research direction.
As a central issue in online advertising, optimizing under budget constraints has been studied
extensively both from publishers’ (or search engines’) point of view [15, 7, 10, 6, 14], and from
advertisers’ point of view [4, 9, 17, 5, 16, 8, 2]. More closely relevant to this paper, the bid
optimization with budget constraints has also been studied from advertisers’ perspective: This
has been considered either in a repeated auction setting [4], or in the context of broad-match ad
auctions [8], or the case of long-term carryover effects [2].
2 Hardness results
We present lower bounds of Ω(
√
n) and Ω(n1/2−) for the multiplicative bidding problem in var-
ious natural scenarios. Besides implying that the approximation algorithm in the next section is
asymptotically optimal, they also show that the requirements enforced on values and prices in our
O(logm)-approximation cannot be easily loosened.
Lemma 1. There exists an instance such that the gap between multiplicative bidding and individual
bidding is Ω(
√
n), even when the prices are all equal.
Proof. Consider the following bad instance where m = n:
• prices: pij = 1
• values: vii = 1, vij = 0
• budget: B = n (vij) =
 1 0. . .
0 1

Hence, we have OPT = n by picking all diagonal cells. We make a crucial observation that
realizes the tension to bid multiplicatively. This will be recurrent in this paper:
Observation 1. If our bid multipliers capture both (i, i) and (j, j) entries, then at least one of
(i, j) and (j, i) is also captured.
The reason for this is simple. Capturing both (i, i) and (j, j) implies that ri · ci ≥ pii = 1 and
rj · cj ≥ pjj = 1. Thus, we must have ri · cj ≥ pij = 1 or rj · ci ≥ pji = 1. In fact, all we need is
piipjj = pijpji.
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Now we return to the main proof. Suppose that we collect k diagonal entries. Then we must
also collect at least
(
k
2
)
off-diagonal entries by the observation. Therefore,
B = n ≥
(
k
2
)
=⇒ ALG = k = O(√n) = O(OPT/√n).
In light of the last lemma, one might hope that some less pessimistic approximation ratio is
attainable under certain conditions. We rule out one such possibility.
Prices and values are monotone in both dimensions if the rows and columns can be rearranged
so that for any i ≥ i′, j ≥ j′, we have vij ≥ vi′j′ and pij ≥ pi′j′ .
Lemma 2. There exists an instance such that the gap between multiplicative bidding and individual
bidding is Ω(n1/3), even when the prices and values are monotone.
Proof. The proof is a more elaborate version of Lemma 1. Consider the following bad instance
where m = n:
• pij = n−1/3, vij = 0 for i+ j < n+ 1 (above antidiagonal)
• pij = 1, vij = 1 for i+ j = n+ 1 (on antidiagonal)
• pij = n1/3, vij = 1 for i+ j > n+ 1 (below antidiagonal)
• B = n
(pij) =
 n
−1/3 1
. .
.
1 n1/3
 , (vij) =
 0 1. . .
1 1

Again, we have OPT = n by picking all antidiagonal entries. Our goal is to show that no
algorithm achieves a total value of ω(n2/3).
Let k be the number of antidiagonal entries captured. Further let k1 and k2 be the numbers of
entries captured above and below the antidiagonal respectively. As in Lemma 1, we have k1 + k2 ≥(
k
2
)
.
On the other hand, the budget constraint dictates that
k + k1n
−1/3 + k2n1/3 ≤ n,
which gives k1 ≤ n4/3, k2 ≤ n2/3 and in turn k = O(n2/3). Our claim is immediate since
ALG = k + k2 = O(n
2/3).
We next generalize the construction above to establish an Ω(n
c−1
2c−1 ) gap for an arbitrary positive
integer c. Thus the case here corresponds to c = 2. By taking c → ∞, we conclude a hardness of
Ω(n1/2−).
Lemma 3. There is an instance such that the gap between multiplicative bidding and individual
bidding is Ω(n1/2−), even when the prices and values are monotone.
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Proof. The bad instance used here extends the one in the proof of Lemma 2. Consider the following
where m = n and c ≥ 2 is a fixed integer:
• pij = n
1
1−2c , vij = 0 for i+ j < n+ 1 (above antidiagonal)
• pij = 1, vij = 1 for i+ j = n+ 1 (on antidiagonal)
• pij = n
c−1
2c−1 , vij = 1 for i+ j > n+ 1 (below antidiagonal)
• B = n
(pij) =

n
1
1−2c 1
. .
.
1 n
c−1
2c−1
 , (vij) =
 0 1. . .
1 1

Thus, OPT = n by picking all antidiagonal entries. We will show that ALG = O(n
c
2c−1 ). Again, let
k, k1 and k2 be the numbers of entries captured on, above and below the antidiagonal respectively.
We begin by re-establishing the inequality k1 + k2 ≥
(
k
2
)
.
Consider c antidiagonal entries (i1, j1), · · · , (ic, jc), where i1 < · · · < ic. We claim that if all of
these c entries are captured, then so is at least one of (i1, j2), (i2, j3), · · · , (ic−1, jc), (ic, j1).
This is clear by noticing that the product of the prices for the first group of entries equals 1,
which is the same as the second group’s
(
n
1
1−2c
)c−1 · n c−12c−1 = 1. An illustration with c = 3 is
provided below, where (*) and (#) denote the antidiagonal entries chosen and the corresponding
off-antidiagonal entries. 
# ∗
# ∗
∗ #

Now for each group of c antidiagonal entries captured, we must have captured some correspond-
ing off-antidiagonal entry. There are
(
k
c
)
such groups. Since each off-antidiagonal entry identify
two members of such a group, it corresponds to at most
(
k
c−2
)
groups. In other words, there are
k1 + k2 ≥
(
k
c
)/( k
c− 2
)
= Θ(k2)
off-antidiagonal entries.
The rest of the proof is similar to before. The budget constraint gives us
k + k1n
1
1−2c + k2n
c−1
2c−1 ≤ n.
Combining both inequalities yields ALG = O(n
c
2c−1 ). Finally, our proof finishes by letting c →
∞.
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Finally, we show that the approximation ratio is still dismal even when compared against the
less stringent multiplicative bidding optimum.
Lemma 4. Unless NP ⊆ BPP, there is no randomized polynomial-time algorithm that finds a
solution of value within a factor of O(n
1−
2 ) of the optimal multiplicative bidding solution.
Proof. This is based on the well-known hardness of n1− for maximum independent set [12]. Given
a graph G = (V,E) with the maximum independent set of size |S| ≥ n1−/4, we consider the n
multiplicative bidding instances below, where m = n = |V |:
• pii = 1, vii = 1
• pij = 1, vij = 0 for (i, j) ∈ E
• pij = 0, vij = 0 for (i, j) /∈ E
• B = |S|
In other words, the values and prices respectively form the identity matrix In and In + A(G)
where A(G) is the adjacency matrix of G. It should be clear that the multiplicative bidding
optimum simply captures all S × S entries and achieves a total value of |S|.
Suppose that some polynomial time algorithm finds a solution of value at least |S|/n1−. Let
S′ ⊆ [n] be the diagonal entries captured. Then
|S′| ≥ |S|
n(1−)/2.
By the same argument in the proof of Lemma 1, the algorithm also captures at least one of (i, j)
and (j, i) for every i, j ∈ S′. Therefore the number of edges within S′ cannot exceed the budget
|S|, i.e.,
E(S′) ≤ |S|.
Now we exhibit an independent subset S′′ ⊆ S′ of size n/2. This would lead to an n1−O()-
approximation for maximum independent set.
Consider a random subset S′′ ⊆ S′ of size n/9. We bound the expected number of edges within
S′′. Note that each edge within S′ falls inside S′′ with probability less than n/4/|S′|2. Thus the
expected number of edges is less than
n/4
|S′|2 · E(S
′) ≤ n/4 · n
1−
|S|2 · |S| ≤ n
−/2,
where we used |S| ≥ n1−/4. This shows that S′′ is independent with high probability.
3 Tight O(
√
n)-approximation algorithm for the general case
In this section, we present an O(
√
n)-approximation for the multiplicative bidding problem. This
matches the lower bound in Lemmas 1 and 4. Our algorithm will greedily construct at most O(
√
n)
disjoint feasible solutions whose union captures all the cells in the individual bidding optimum OPT.
The approximation promise follows immediately by picking one among these.
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We first give an overview of the class of solutions found by the algorithm before describing it
formally. Each of the solutions will focus on certain active columns. This can be done by bidding
0 on the other columns.
On the other hand, the bid on each active column is just 1, and the bid on row i equals the
maximum price pij among the entries (i, j) ∈ OPT in an active column j, or simply 0 if there is no
such entry.
Observe that this kind of bidding allows us to capture all the OPT entries in the active columns.
Our algorithm is stated as Algorithm 1. Notice that the candidate solutions V in the while loop
are constructed in a greedy manner.
Algorithm 1: O(
√
n) approximation
U ←− [n];
candidates←− ∅;
while |U | > 2√n do
Let V ⊆ U be a maximal set of at most √n columns such that
m∑
i=1
max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij ≤ B|V | ,
where the max is 0 if there is no cell from OPT in row i and columns in V ;
Add V to candidates;
Remove V from U ;
end
For each remaining j ∈ U , add V = {j} to candidates;
Output the best V from candidates
For the best candidate set V in the algorithm, we bid as follows:
• For j /∈ V , cj = 0.
• For j ∈ V , cj = 1.
• For i ∈ [m], ri = max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij , or 0 if ∀j ∈ V , (i, j) /∈ OPT.
As mentioned before, this bidding scheme captures all the OPT cells from columns in V by
design. We first show that such a solution is indeed feasible.
Lemma 5. For each candidate V , the total spend is at most B.
Proof. If V is chosen in the while loop, then for row i we spend at most |V |ri = |V | max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij .
Summing over all rows, we get
m∑
i=1
|V | max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij ≤ |V | · B|V | = B.
On the other hand, it is clear that the solution for V chosen after the while loop is a subset of OPT
and hence costs at most B.
9
Next we establish the approximation guarantee. The intuition behind it is that when V is not
large, it consumes a relatively large amount of the budget and hence there cannot be too many
|V | < √n.
Lemma 6. If |V | < √n and V is picked before the last candidate in the while loop of the algorithm,
we have
m∑
i=1
max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij ≥ B
4|V | . (*)
In particular, the OPT entries from columns in V cost at least B/4|V |.
Proof. By the maximality of V , the fact that V has not reached the size
√
n implies that no column
can be added to V .
Note that inserting a new column j to V increases the L.H.S. of (*) by at most
∑
i:(i,j)∈OPT pij ,
i.e., the amount OPT spends on j.
Since V is not the last, there must be more than 2
√
n available columns in U , one of which
costs no more than B/2
√
n ≤ B/2(|V |+ 1). By the maximality of V , this column cannot be added
to V and we must then have
B
2(|V |+ 1) +
m∑
i=1
max
(i,j)∈OPT,j∈V
pij >
B
|V |+ 1 ,
from which our result follows.
Theorem 1. The algorithm above achieves an approximation ratio of O(
√
n).
Proof. It suffices to show that there are O(
√
n) candidates V as they collectively capture all of OPT.
Since there can be at most
√
n of them of size
√
n, and at most 2
√
n candidates V after the while
loop, it suffices to bound the number of candidates V with size smaller than
√
n in the loop.
Let a1, · · · , ak be their sizes. Then trivially a1 + · · · + ak ≤ n. By Lemma 6, their OPT entries
cost at least B/4a1 + · · ·+B/4ak ≤ B, hence 1/a1 + · · ·+ 1/ak ≤ 4. Now by the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality,
4n ≥ (a1 + · · ·+ ak)
(
1
a1
+ · · ·+ 1
ak
)
≥ k2.
This gives k ≤ 2√n, as desired.
Finally, we remark that a O(
√
m)-approximation can be obtained by swapping the roles of rows
and columns. Combining both gives a O(min{√m,√n})-approximation.
4 Staircases as the building block
We introduce an important notion which provides a sufficient condition on the feasibility of a
solution. As we shall see, it will be helpful in deriving approximation algorithms for our problem
as this subclass of solutions is much easier to work with.
Definition 1. A configuration S ⊆ [m] × [n] is a staircase if for any i, j ∈ [n], its subset of cells
in column i is a subset or superset of that in column j.
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Figure 1: A regular staircase with four rows and four columns. The numbers shown at the bottom
and to the right are the column and row multipliers respectively. The numbers shown in blue
inside the staircase indicate the effective bids with a lower bound of 1/δ. The numbers shown in
red outside the staircase are the effective bids with an upper bound of δ. Note that each row or
column can have different height or width if we repeat the associated multiplier.
It is clear that replacing columns by rows in the definition makes no difference. The name
staircase originates from the fact that the rows and columns can be permuted in such a way that
S indeed resembles a staircase (with possibly uneven step sizes).
Lemma 7. Ignoring the budget constraint, a staircase S can always be captured exactly.
Proof. Figure 1 demonstrates our bidding scheme to capture a simple staircase. Notice that we
are bidding 1/δi within the staircase and δi outside, where i is a positive integer varying across
different cells. By making δ sufficiently small, we can capture the staircase exactly.
In general, if S has no entry in any row or column, we set the corresponding bid multiplier to
0 and thus essentially remove it. We then permute the remaining rows and columns such that our
staircase takes on a shape as Figure 1. For the rows, we simply bid 1/δ, 1/δ3, · · · successively on
each level from top to bottom. In contrast, the bids on the columns are 1, δ2, · · · on each level from
right to left.
4.1 1-approximation for the case of monotone vij/pij
The staircase idea immediately implies that our problem can be solved (almost) exactly under one
natural assumption.
Corollary 1. If the ratios vij/pij are monotone in one dimension, then there is a 1-approximation
algorithm.
Proof. This is immediate since OPT, which collects entries with the best v/p ratio as long as the
budget B has not been exhausted, will be a staircase when v/p is monotone in one dimension. By
Lemma 7, OPT can be captured exactly. This can be implemented efficiently by selecting the entries
with highest v/p ratios one at a time.
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5 O(logm)-approximation when prices are multiplicative and val-
ues are monotone
In this section, we make the following two assumptions on the prices and values.
• Multiplicative prices: there are pi, qj > 0 such that pij = pi · qj .
• Monotone values: the values are monotone along one dimension, say, rows. In other words,
the rows can be permuted so that vij ≥ vi′j for i′ > i.
Both of them are necessary in the sense that without either of them, no algorithm can have a
good performance as demonstrated by the bad instances in Lemmas 1 and 3. In the former case,
the instance has all prices equal (hence multiplicative) and a gap of Ω(
√
n), whereas in the latter
case, the values are even monotone in both dimensions but the gap is Ω(n1/2−). Our assumptions
are verified empirically in Section 6.
We now have a nice characterization of the configurations that can be captured.
Lemma 8. If prices are multiplicative, a configuration S ⊆ [m]× [n] can be captured if and only if
it is a staircase.
Proof. One direction simply reiterates Lemma 7. For the other direction, let S be a feasible
configuration that is not a staircase. Equivalently, there are two columns j1 and j2 for which
S ∩ ([m]× {j1}) is neither a subset nor a superset of S ∩ ([m]× {j2}).
Thus, there are some i1 and i2 such that (i1, j1), (i2, j2) ∈ S and (i1, j2), (i2, j1) /∈ S. This is
a contradiction since the former implies that (ri1cj1)(ri2cj2) ≥ (pi1pj1)(pi2pj2) but the latter gives
(ri1cj2)(ri2cj1) < (pi1pj2)(pi2pj1).
As a consequence of this lemma, it is sufficient to search for a good staircase within our budget.
We present an algorithm fulfilling this objective step by step, each of which, albeit seemingly unre-
lated, will serve its own purpose. While our derivation establishes an approximation of O(logm),
it can be easily turned into an O(log n)-approximation by swapping the roles of rows and columns
and assuming column monotonicity instead of row monotonicity.
5.1 Algorithm
Our algorithm consists of three major steps. An overview is also given in Algorithm 2.
Step 1: Clustering prices
We round down all row price multipliers pi to powers of 2, and permute the rows such that pi
increases from top to bottom. This results in Figure 2(a) where each inner rectangle represents a
set of rows with equal pi. We call these inner rectangles strips.
Since pi is now a power of 2, the prices of two cells in the same column but consecutive strips
differs by a factor of at least 2.
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Step 2: Finding OPT(B/4)
As one may have guessed, our algorithm builds upon the optimal solution to find a good staircase—
with one caveat. Instead of basing our solution on the OPT with budget B, we use the OPT with
budget B/4, denoted by OPT(B/4). The reason for this choice will become apparent in the proof
of Lemma 10.
We first permute the rows within each strip such that vij is increasing as we traverse down. This
is possible because of value monotonicity. Now OPT(B/4) must consist of width-1 towers that sit on
the bottom of our strips, as the prices within the same column in a strip are constant. Figure 2(b)
gives one possible OPT(B/4).
In summary, we
• permute the rows in each strip such that vij ’s are increasing from top to bottom; and
• find the cells in OPT(B/4), which must emanate from the bottom of a strip.
Step 3: Constructing a staircase from OPT(B/4)
The last step of our staircase construction is made up of two main substeps: we first extract a
subset of OPT(B/4) according to a certain parameter h ∈ [m] and then apply some patching work
to transform it into a staircase, denoted ALGh. The final solution ALG will be the best ALGh.
Again, for notational convenience we will use ALGh and ALG to denote both the set of cells in
the solution and their total value.
• Disregard strips of height less than h
No cells in such strips will be chosen.
• Take all height-h towers
For the constituent towers of OPT(B/4) with height at least h, we select its h × 1 subtower
sitting on the bottom of a strip (Figure 2(c)), and insert them into ALGh.
• Propagate/copy the height-h towers upwards
If the h × 1 subtower in strip i and column j is chosen in the previous step, we select the
corresponding h× 1 subtower in strip i′ and column j for all i′ < i provided that strip i′ has
height at least h (Figure 2(d)). They are inserted into ALGh.
Our solution ALGh thus consists of all the cells selected above. In the figures, these are depicted
as red and hatched blue regions. Notice that no cells in strip 2 were selected since its height is
smaller than h. A height-h tower can be chosen in both steps.
The algorithm outputs the best ALGh for 1 ≤ h ≤ m, i.e., ALG = maxh∈[m] ALGh.
5.2 Analysis
Lemma 9. ALGh is a staircase.
Proof. This is almost by design. For each column, the cells in ALGh are exactly the height-h
towers up to some strip i (excluding those whose height is less than h). This is guaranteed by the
propagation operation.
Thus the cells of ALGh in a column must be a subset or superset of that in another.
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(a) Strips.
ha
(b) OPT(B/4).
h
h
h
(c) Finding towers of height h.
h
h
h
(d) Propagating towers upwards.
Figure 2: The steps in approximating the best multiplicative bidding scheme. The green “towers”
in (b) show the cells in OPT(B/4). The red lines in (c) illustrate one candidate height h. Note that
the second strip is shorter than h, and therefore does not contribute to ALGh at all. The red towers
in (c) depict the intermediate solution of height h; this is extended to ALGh in (d) via propagating
upwards: see the hatched towers.
Algorithm 2: Overview of O(logm) approximation
Step 1:
Round down all of the pi’s to the nearest powers of 2;
Cluster together rows with the same pi;
Reorder the clusters in increasing pi;
Step 2:
Reorder the rows within each cluster in increasing values;
Compute OPT(B/4), the individual bidding optimum with budget B/4;
Step 3:
for h=1,2,. . . ,m do
ALGh ←− ∅;
Insert into ALGh all height-h towers of OPT(B/4);
Insert into ALGh all height-h towers in the strips above the ones in the last line;
end
Output the best ALGh as ALG
14
Lemma 10. ALGh costs no more than B, i.e.,
∑
(i,j)∈ALGh pij ≤ B.
Proof. First of all, the cells selected in the first substep of step 3 cost at most B/4 since they are
part of OPT(B/4). We argue that the propagation operation, which is the second substep, spends
also at most B/4.
Recall that we have rounded the row price multipliers to powers of 2 in step 1. In particular,
the prices between two consecutive strips must then differ by a factor of 2 or more. Therefore a
height-h tower, when copied upwards, spends at most 1/2i of its cost on the i-th strip above it.
Now summing over all height-h towers from OPT(B/4), the total cost of the propagation oper-
ation does not exceed B/4 · (1/2 + 1/4 + . . . ) = B/4.
Our total cost, which has accounted for all of ALGh, is bounded by B/4 +B/4 = B/2. Finally,
since we have rounded down prices to powers of 2 in step 1, the actual cost of ALGh cannot be more
than twice of B/2.
Lemma 11. We have OPT(B/4) ≥ OPT · (1/4− ).
Proof. We will use the small cost assumption pij/B <  here.
2
Recall that OPT(B′) collects the cells (i, j) in the order of decreasing vij/pij until the budget
B′ is exhausted. Thus, the extra cells collected in OPT \ OPT(B/4), which cost 3B/4, each have a
vij/pij ratio no better than those in OPT(B/4).
This implies that OPT ≤ OPT(B/4)1/4− , since OPT(B/4) has a cost of more than B · (1/4 − ) by the
small cost assumption.
Lemma 12. We have ALGh ≥ OPT(B/4)/2 logm for some h.
Proof. Let OPTh(B/4) be the total values of the OPT(B/4) cells at height h in each strip. We claim
that
ALGh ≥ h · OPTh(B/4).
This can be seen as follows. Each cell (i, j) ∈ OPTh(B/4) is the top of some height-h tower in a
strip. Notice that the h − 1 cells below (i, j) have values at least vij by value monotonicity. Our
claim then follows from summing over all (i, j) ∈ OPTh(B/4).
The rest of the proof is standard. Suppose that no choice of h gives ALGh ≥ OPT(B/4)/2 logm.
Then for all h, we have
h · OPTh(B/4) ≤ ALGh < OPT(B/4)
2 logm
,
which implies
OPT(B/4) =
m∑
h=1
OPTh(B/4) <
m∑
h=1
OPT(B/4)
h · 2 logm ≤ OPT(B/4).
This is a contradiction.
Combining all the lemmas, we obtain our main result.
Theorem 2. Our algorithm gives an O(logm)-approximation.
Proof. Lemmas 9 and 10 establish the feasibility of ALGh. The approximation guarantee follows
from Lemmas 11 and 12.
2We note that, as mentioned before, our O(logm)-approximation still holds without it.
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We highlight the roles played by different steps of the algorithm. Step 1, which clusters similar
price multipliers, ensures that the propagation procedure in Step 3 would result in a convergent
geometric sum for the cost. Step 2 computes OPT(B/4) which is essential to achieving our approx-
imation guarantee as well as the budget constraint. Lastly, the propagation procedure in Step 3
also enforces the staircase feasibility.
Our ratio of O(logm) might not be the most desirable. However, the algorithm likely outper-
forms its theoretical guarantee in average case. For example, one reason is that the propagation
procedure hatches new towers above existing ones but their values are not accounted for in the
analysis as they can be negligible in the worst case. In practice, however, such an extreme pattern
of values should be rare.
Finally, we outline an approach that may yield an improved O
(
logm
log logm
)
-approximation.
5.3 Towards O
(
logm
log logm
)
-approximation
We incorporate into our algorithm a heuristic which improves the approximation factor for certain
instances. Recall how we are handling the strips. For each of them, we capture all of its height-h
sub-towers. Besides guaranteeing good approximation, it ensures that we are not overspending as
they are part of OPT.
In retrospect, it is actually possible to achieve an even better performance by capturing some
of the remaining entries, while still not violating our budget. We prove the following lemma which
subsumes the essence of our algorithm.
Lemma 13. Let m be a positive integer. Given a piecewise-continuous monotonically decreasing
function f : (0,m] → R+, let A =
∫m
0 f(t)dt be the area under f . Then there is some integer
h ∈ (0,m] for which the overlap of the rectangle [0, h]× [0, A/h] with the region under f is at least
Θ(A log logm/ logm).
Proof. Since we can write f as the limit of a sequence of monotonically decreasing continuous
functions, we assume for convenience that f is continuous so that f−1 is well-defined on [f(h), f(0)).
Observe the trivial fact A/h ≥ f(h).
Consider the sequence defined by t1 = m and whenever A/ti ≤ f(0+),
ti+1 = f
−1(A/ti).
We claim that some ti satisfies our requirement. Note that the rectangles for these h = ti cover the
entire region under f . Let α = log logm/ logm.
If ti+1 ≥ αti for some i, then the intersection between the region under f and the rectangle
[0, ti+1]× [0, A/ti+1] has an area at least
ti+1 · A
ti
≥ Aα.
If there is no such i, then every two successive ti must be of a factor greater than α apart.
Hence our sequence has no more than logαm = logm/ log logm terms, one of which must give a
rectangle that covers a region of area Θ(A log logm/ logm) under f .
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Notice that the rectangle [0, h]× [0, A/h] has area precisely A. Informally, it enforces the budget
constraint. Furthermore, the fact that the rectangle does not fall completely under f means that
we are not just taking towers of height at least h, which in turn enhances our performance.
Finally, we remark that the factor Θ
(
logm
log logm
)
is essentially the best by inspecting the lemma
with f(t) = 1/(t+ 1).
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm that delivers a staircase of value at least
Θ
(
log logm
logm
)
·B min
(i,j)∈OPT
vij
pij
.
Proof. We adopt the notation of Lemma 13.
Recall that OPTh(B/4) is the set of the cells in OPT(B/4) at height h. Define f : (0,m] → R+
by
f(t) =
∑
(i,j)∈OPTh(B/4)
pij
for h− 1 < t ≤ h. Alternately, f is formed by juxtaposing the towers of OPT(B/4) in the order of
their heights. Note that A =
∫m
0 f(t)dt is precisely the total price of OPT(B/4), which is just B/4.
By Lemma 13, there is some h whose intersection with the region under f has area at least
Θ
(
A
log logm
logm
)
= Θ
(
B
log logm
logm
)
.
Now by taking the height-h3 towers corresponding to the intersection, we spend at most A =
B/4. On the other hand, the total value of our solution is at least
Θ
(
B · log logm
logm
)
· min
(i,j)∈OPT
vij
pij
= Θ
(
log logm
logm
)
·B min
(i,j)∈OPT
vij
pij
.
Now the rest of the proof follows in the same manner as Theorem 2.
In particular, if the ratios
vij
pij
are close to being uniform in OPT, we have an O
(
logm
log logm
)
-
approximation.
6 Empirical study
In this section, we report the results of our experiments. We start by explaining the algorithms
implemented, followed by a discussion on their empirical performances. An analysis is also given
on the validity of the assumptions made throughout the paper.
3It is possible that the tower resides in a strip of height less than h, in which case we would just take it top-to-
bottom.
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6.1 Algorithms and implementation notes
We have tested our algorithms on real world data and compared their performances. We discuss
how they are implemented in the rest of this section.
One of the recurrent themes in our paper is monotonicity. In the real world, however, data
rarely obey monotonicity perfectly due to presence of noise, among other factors. To apply our
algorithms, we must still somehow obtain a decent ordering of the rows (or columns) so that
monotonicity approximately holds.
For instance, our monotone value-over-price ratio algorithm from Corollary 1 assumes that
vij/pij increases along the columns (or rows). In essence, each of the n columns induces one
possible (partial4) permutation of the rows and our job is to aggregate these n candidates into
one representative “consensus permutation”. To this end, we adopt the procedure in Algorithm 3.
This is also used as a subroutine of our O(log n)-approximation implementation to rank values. See
section 6.3.2 for a more in-depth discussion of the method.
6.1.1 Staircase algorithm: 1-approximation for Monotone value-over-price ratios
The discussion above sums up how we permute the rows. In the theoretical algorithm, the next
step is to simply take OPT, which is a staircase, as the solution. But as mentioned before, this is
not always feasible due to imperfect monotonicity. In the implementation, we resort instead to
finding a good staircase. More specifically, our solution captures a number of consecutive cells at
the bottom of each column.
Thus now we have m possible choices for each column. The resulting optimization problem can
be solved by a dynamic program that computes the best solutions formed by the first j columns
for different budget thresholds.
6.1.2 Tower building algorithm: O(log n)-approximation for multiplicative prices and
monotone values
This is similar to the last implementation. We first cluster together rows with similar prices. For
each cluster we then find a permutation of its rows so that values are roughly monotone. At this
point we encounter the same issue, namely that OPT(B/4) is not necessarily a staircase in each
price cluster. Moreover, the factor 1/4 for budget scaling is a rather arbitrary parameter to make
the formal analysis go through. Our implementation employs a different view of the algorithm via
dynamic programming.
For a given column, our algorithm has the freedom to choose the height-h towers in the first i
price clusters, where i ranges from 0 to the number of clusters. Hence there are at most m choices
per column. Now the dynamic program simply recursively computes the best solution formed by
the first j columns for different budget thresholds.
6.1.3 Uniform bidding
We use an algorithm similar to that proposed by Feldman et al. [9] as a baseline of how well our
algorithms perform. Feldman et al. show that in a large class of bidding problems5, using a single
4The permutations are sometimes partial since the values of a cell can be missing due to data sparsity.
5They define their model based on how bids translate to costs and clicks in a collection of second-price auctions
by looking at the so-called bid landscapes.
18
Figure 3: The performance of the three algorithms. The plot shows what percentage of the indi-
vidual bidding optimum each algorithm achieves, and quantifies it based on fraction of instances.
For instance, at the 50% percentile, in half the instances the performance of the three algorithms
is 69%, 69%, 92%, respectively.
bid on all keywords guarantees a 1− 1/e approximation, and provides much better performance in
practice.
In our adaptation of that algorithm, we find the largest single bid b that can be placed on all cells
in the table while respecting the budget constraint. Clearly this can be realized by multiplicative
bidding.
6.2 Results and comparison
We use a dataset of 1000 randomly selected anonymized advertisers using Google AdWords sys-
tem. Two of the dimensions that these advertisers can provide bid multipliers for are “geo” and
“keyword.” The types of impressions that the advertisers are interested in has a wide range as well:
from a few up to hundreds of different geo locations, and from tens to thousands of keywords. For
our experiments, conversion data acts as a proxy for value, and historic cost-per-click data is used
to derive sample price.
We first plot the performance of the three different algorithms, namely uniform bidding, O(log n)
approximation (also called “tower building”) and ratio-based optimization (also called “staircase”).
The three curves in Figure 3 show the percentage of the individual bidding optimum that each algo-
rithm can obtain. The uniform bidding approach guarantees 64% of the optimum on average, while
this number is 66% and 85% for O(log n) approximation and ratio-based optimization, respectively.
The median performances for the three algorithms are 69%, 69%, 92% respectively.
These numbers suggest that the staircase approach is much better than the uniform bidding,
whereas the tower building algorithm does not give us any benefits over the uniform bidding.
The latter conclusion is not entirely true. Investigating how often the tower building algorithm
outperforms the uniform bidding result, we find that the best of the two algorithms provides a
mean of 75% and a median of 81% for performance. Figure 4 illustrates this with a histogram of
the gain of the two algorithms over the uniform bidding result. Finally we compare the staircase
and tower building algorithms. As expected from the above analysis, the former is almost always
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Figure 4: The gain of our algorithms with respect to uniform bidding. For example, at 0.25 on the
x axis, we can read the number of instances where either algorithm could improve uniform bidding
by 25%.
Figure 5: Comparison between our two algorithms: tower building vs. staircase
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Figure 6: Verifying that prices are multiplicative. For all i, j, the actual market price pij (y-axis)
is plotted against a predicted market price ricj (x-axis), where ri and cj are computed using linear
regression. Prices are shown in log scale, under a linear transformation to [0, 1].
the better approach. Though the latter outperforms the former in 10% of the instances in our
dataset, the gains in these cases are nominal. See Figure 5 for details.
6.3 Validating our assumptions
6.3.1 Are prices multiplicative?
To validate the assumption that prices are multiplicative, we looked at click price data from Ad-
Words, aggregating by the country in which the search query was performed, and the hour of the
day. (We did this aggregation over all ad clicks over a week of time in November, 2013.) From this
we obtained pij , the average click price for each combination of country i and hour j. We then
looked for two vectors r and c such that the price pij was well-approximated by ricj . To find this
vector we ran a linear regression fitting log(pij) ∼ log(r1) + · · ·+ log(rn) + log(c1) + · · ·+ log(cm),
which results in independent coefficients for each country and each hour of the day. If this is a
good fit, it means that log(pij) ≈ log(ri) + log(cj), which implies pij ≈ ricj .
The regression indeed was a good fit, with virtually every country and hour as significant
predictors, and an R2 value of 0.94. The density plot in Figure 6 shows the actual prices vs. the
prices predicted by the regression model, i.e., it plots pij vs. ricj (note the scale has been changed
to [0, 1] for privacy purposes).
6.3.2 Are values and ratios monotone?
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Sj ⊆ [m] be the set of entries in column j, and pij be the permutation of Sj
induced by increasing order of the values (or ratios) of Sj . In other words, we have n partial
4
permutations of [m] which we wish to aggregate into one “consensus” permutation pi.
Our heuristic in Algorithm 3 was inspired by the algorithm for rank aggregation in Ailon et al.
[1], where the input orderings pij are complete rather than partial.
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Algorithm 3: Heuristic for computing consensus permutation
Input: partial permutations pi1, . . . , pin
Output: total ordering pi
Construct a digraph D over the vertex set [m]:
for i, i′ ∈ [m], i 6= i′ do
if no pij contains both i, i
′ then
continue;
end
if more than half the pij’s containing i, i
′ have i <pij i′ then
insert edge (i, i′) to D;
else
insert edge (i′, i) to D;
end
end
Maintain a partial order pi initialized to be empty:
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
Let si ∈ [m] be a random vertex of D not processed yet.
for each parent p of si do
make p <pi si in pi if p, si are currently incomparable;
end
for each child c of si do
make c >pi si in pi if c, si are currently incomparable;
end
end
while pi is not yet a total order do
find two incomparable i, i′ ∈ [m] and make i <pi i′ in pi;
end
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Monotonicity for 25% 50% Mean 75%
Value 0.8838 0.9697 0.9042 1.0
Ratio 0.8648 0.9500 0.9059 1.0
Figure 7: Verifying “monotonicity” assumptions in our dataset. The table shows the mean and
median as well as the 14 and
3
4 quantiles for both measurements.
In words, the heuristic first constructs a digraph encoding the dominance relationship between
every two i, i′ ∈ [m] by a majority vote. Then a random vertex is selected one at a time and used to
extend our partial order pi. At the end, the remaining incomparable pairs are ordered arbitrarily.
We evaluate how good pi is with respect to pi1, . . . , pin by the fraction of agreements:
quality(pi;pi1, . . . , pin) =
∑n
j=1 #{(i, i′) ∈ Sj × Sj |i <pij i′, i <pi i′}∑n
j=1
(|Sj |
2
) .
Thus we have quality(pi;pi1, . . . , pin) = 1 if our total order pi is perfectly consistent with all
of pi1, . . . , pin, showing that our values are monotone. On the other hand, for any given complete
permutation pi1, . . . , pin, it is possible to construct a pi with quality
1
2 by choosing a random pij .
This is in fact the well-known folklore 2-approximation for the rank aggregation problem. As an
example, feeding our heuristic with random complete permutations will generate a total order with
quality 12 in expectation.
Figure 7 plots a histogram of this quality measure for the heuristic consensus permutations
found. Note that this is only a lower bound on how monotone the instance is because perhaps we
did not find the best consensus permutation.
7 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper we have formulated the multiplicative bidding problem, and characterized its com-
plexity in various cases. In many settings it is Ω(n1/2−)-hard to approximate. Nonetheless, the
problem becomes approximable after imposing appropriate and natural assumptions on the input.
A wealth of future work on this new scheme awaits to be studied, and we sample a few which we
believe are of particular prominence.
One obvious question is to close the gap for the case of multiplicative prices and monotone values.
It is also worthwhile to explore the complexity of the problem under other realistic assumptions
(e.g., multiplicative values and correlated values/prices).
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Taking a step back, most of our results are concerned with the individual bidding optimum
but an advertiser may be more interested in learning how well he could be doing rather than
understanding the inherent limitation of multiplicative bidding. While we have a hardness of
Ω(n
1−
2 ) against the multiplicative bidding optimum for the general case, the prospect of better
approximations in other cases is not ruled out.
Another interesting direction is to improve our model, or even to propose a new one altogether.
One may, for instance, introduce a nonuniform supply constraint. In our model, each cell supplies
only one unit of the item. More generally, we can consider the landscape function which specifies
the price of an item at different supply levels.
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